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This paper explores the integration of energy and agricultural markets. A year ago, the paper would have been relatively simple and straight-forward. Through last summer, energy and agricultural markets were clearly closely linked. As the price of crude oil increased, so did the price of corn and other agricultural commodities. And when crude oil started to decline in the summer of 2008, so did the prices of agricultural commodities. The basic mechanism was that a higher crude oil price leads to higher gasoline price, which increases the demand for corn ethanol as a substitute for gasoline. More corn ethanol capacity comes on line demanding more corn, which, in turn leads to corn price increases (Tyner 2008) . We saw that model in operation In this paper, we will address these issues. First, we will develop the energy agriculture linkage that emerged in the 2006-08 period. Part of that story will entail examining the impact of US ethanol policies on development of the industry. Then, we will explore the recent developments and explain why the corn -ethanol link emerged.
Finally, after understanding these two sets of drivers, we will explore what the future might hold in terms of energy agriculture linkages and why. Figure 1 shows the continued strong links among the commodity prices, especially to energy/agricultural price links, both as prices rise and as they fall (Abbott, Hurt et al. 2008) . The graph provides an index of prices with 2002 equal to one. The main point of this graph is that the commodity prices have moved together for the most part. Behind the increased biofuels production were both government policy drivers and high oil prices. Government policies were important in all cases, and in particular were critical in launching the ethanol and biodiesel industries in earlier years. Since 2006, however, the increasing oil price was an especially important driver in the United States. Agricultural commodity prices followed crude oil both up and down. In the E.U., government policy remained the dominant driver, as biodiesel is less competitive than ethanol without government intervention.
Energy -agriculture linkage
Since 2006, the ethanol market in the United States has established a link between the prices of crude oil and corn-a link that did not exist historically (Abbott, Hurt et al. 2008) . Table 1 contains price correlations for the 1988-2005, 2006-2008, and 2008-09 periods. Crude oil and gasoline correlations are high in all three periods as would be expected. In the period 1988-2005, there is little apparent correlation between crude oil and corn prices-it is, in fact, low and negative. If one had chosen a different period, it might be low and positive, but the point is that historically it has been quite low. The crude oil -corn link is further illustrated in Clearly the oil price driver continues to be very important. The policy drivers also remain important. In the EU, the strong political support for biofuels has waned somewhat for two reasons-concern over greenhouse gas emissions (GHG) that may be associated with biofuels and food-fuel price concerns that arose in 2008. In the EU, policy was a more important driver than oil prices because biodiesel from plant sources Sources: DOE/EIA for crude oil, and USDA for corn and soybean prices.
In the United States, the main policy instruments are the subsidy, the Renewable The analytics of a binding RFS are shown in Figure 5 . Point a in Figure 5 represents the market equilibrium price and quantity with a subsidy and non-binding RFS. Point b represents the market price and quantity with a binding RFS. Since the RFS is assumed to bind, the quantity produced and consumed is higher than the market equilibrium, and the higher price reflects the economic rent associated with the binding RFS. In other words, the change in pricing regime could be due to the binding of the RFS and the rent associated with that binding constraint. With either pricing paradigm for ethanol, however, there is still a strong link between crude oil and corn prices, just with a change in the way it functions. 
Ethanol import tariff
Another U.S. policy issue is the ethanol import tariff, which is 54 cents per gallon plus 2.5% of the import value. For an import value of about $1.50, the total import tariff becomes 58 cents per gallon compared with the current subsidy of 45 cents per gallon.
Since imported ethanol also receives the 45-cent federal subsidy, imported ethanol faces a net penalty of 13 cents per gallon. The raison d'être for the import tariff was to balance off the subsidy that also applied to ethanol imports. Since there is now a large gap between the two, there will be increasing pressure to at least reduce the import tariff.
If the import tariff went to zero or to any level less than the difference between the implicit subsidy/tax with the RFS and the blender credit, there would be a strong incentive to use imported ethanol. In other words, at low oil prices, imported ethanol would benefit from the implicit subsidy/tax (rent) of the binding RFS as would domestic ethanol. For example, at $60 per barrel oil the implicit subsidy/tax from the 15 billion gallons RFS is 83 cents per gallon ( Figure 6 ). As long as the import tariff is less than that level, imported ethanol might be attractive. At high oil prices, the RFS is no longer binding, and the fixed subsidy dominates. However, to the extent that foreign ethanol became more competitive because sugar did not increase in price as much as corn, foreign ethanol could be competitive on the high end as well.
Ethanol blending wall
The last issue to be covered here is the blending wall-the maximum amount of ethanol that could be blended at the current national blending level of 10% (E10). Since the United States consumes about 140 billion gallons of gasoline annually, the theoretical maximum amount of ethanol that could be blended as E10 is 14 billion gallons. The practical limit, at least in the near term, is more like 12 billion gallons (Tyner, Dooley et al. 2008 ) because of inadequate distribution infrastructure and summer blending constraints in southern states due to high evaporative emissions with ethanol blends. Already in place or under construction are over 13 billion gallons of ethanol capacity. At present E85 is tiny, and it would take quite a while to build that market. Since gasoline consumption is a function of gasoline price in our model, the blending wall is modeled here at 9% of gasoline consumption, or 12.6 bil. gal. when total gasoline-type fuel demand is 140 bil. gal. period is so high (0.84).
3 DOE and EPA are examining the possible implications of increasing the ethanol blending percentage from 10% to something higher. Automobile companies are concerned about the implications for fuel systems in the existing automobile fleet. Fuel pumps could be another issue. Corrosion, wear, and performance tests are being conducted to get more information on the implications of a switch to a higher level. The outcome of these tests is unknown at this point. Source: Author's estimates -based on the model described in .
Note: Sub is the current 45 cent per gallon subsidy; sub,BW is that subsidy with the blending wall binding; RFS15 is the 15 bil. gal. mandate; and RFS15,BW is that RFS with the binding blending wall.
The economics are such that in a market that is surplus in ethanol as in summer 2009, the price of ethanol is driven more by the price of corn as the surplus production capacity drives the price of ethanol down to the breakeven price given the corn price.
This market situation is illustrated in Figure 8 . The blend wall is an effective constraint on demand, so the effective demand curve is the standard demand curve down to the blend wall and then the vertical blend wall. Under that condition, the subsidy goes mainly to blended fuel consumers. The RFS anywhere to the right of the blend wall is totally irrelevant because EPA cannot require blenders to blend any quantity of ethanol they are not legally permitted to blend.
Today the blending wall is the biggest policy issue faced by the U.S. corn ethanol industry. The industry cannot grow; indeed, it cannot even return to profitability until that issue is resolved. It appears likely that the blending limit may be extended above the historic linkage between crude oil and corn likely would be re-established. 
Future prospects
In the U.S., corn ethanol likely will not grow beyond the 15 billion gallon level of the RFS allocated to it even if the blending wall issue is resolved. So corn ethanol in the U.S. is a mature industry. The renewable fuels future in the U.S. depends on the development of cellulosic biofuels. There are thermochemical processing technologies that can take cellulosic feedstocks directly to bio-based gasoline and diesel. Successful development of these technologies would avoid the blending wall issues. Our assessment of the likely economics of cellulose conversion indicate that it is expensive even with the best technologies available today, but plausible if oil prices return to previous levels or if the cellulose RFS is deemed to be credible by industry investors. Clearly, development of a cellulosic biofuels industry will depend upon government subsidies and mandates until such time as markets become convinced $100+ crude oil is here to stay. Cellulosic biofuels have lower net greenhouse gas emissions than corn based biofuels. Many argue that they also do not compete with food and feed, so there is no food/fuel issue. However, at the margin, there would be some competition between food/feed uses of lands and biofuels uses -especially at the large scales that would be implied by ambitious U.S. and E.U. biofuels programs. This topic needs further research.
